Are IPOs of Different VCs Different? by Tykvová, Tereza & Walz, Uwe
Discussion Paper No. 04-32
Are IPOs of Different VCs Different?
Tereza Tykvová and Uwe Walz
Discussion Paper No. 04-32
Are IPOs of Different VCs Different?
Tereza Tykvová and Uwe Walz
Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von 
neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung 
der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar.
Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW research promptly available to other 
economists in order to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely 
responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0432.pdf
Non-technical Summary
This paper investigates the impact of venture capitalists (VCs) on
the performance of their portfolio firms around and after initial public
offering (IPO). The aim is to shed some additional light on the function
of VCs in nurturing and developing their portfolio firms as well as on
some mechanisms of the IPO market. Our main working hypothesis is
that venture capital is too heterogenous to permit simple comparison
between non venture and venture-backed firms. We investigate the
hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives, and track
records of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their
respective IPOs. Doing this, we compare the extent of underpricing
and the post-IPO returns and volatility.
We explore these issues using a data set embracing all IPOs that
have occurred on Germany’s Neuer Markt. This segment has proven
to be a natural playing field for such a research strategy, deferring
a number of obvious advantages. Its main advantage is that, due to
the specific situation of the German venture capital market (a young,
rapidly growing market coupled with a strong public sector), we find a
wide array of different types of venture capitalists with quite different
structures, objectives, and track records. Our main aim is to exploit
just this difference and its impact on the performance of portfolio
firms.
We find significant differences among different types of VCs with
respect to the post-IPO market performance. It turns out that firms
backed by independent VCs perform significantly better than firms of
other VCs or non venture-backed ones. Firms backed by public VCs
(only a small group of firms) underperform relative to their counter-
parts. In addition, we find that independent VCs have a significant
impact on the reduction of firm-specific volatility. Thus, indepen-
dent VCs bring about higher (relative) post-IPO returns and less risk.
This result is robust across various methodological approaches and
specifications. The fact that this could occur (implying that market
participants did not anticipate this development) can be interpreted
as a clear sign of the immaturity of the market. Thus, we expect that
such abnormalities will tend to go away as the market grows older and
becomes more established. When looking into the determinants of un-
derpricing we find rather little evidence that the extent of underpricing
differs significantly between firms backed by different VCs.
Our findings on the post-IPO performance imply that the different
types of VCs fulfill their overall task as specialized monitors, consul-
tants, and financiers of young firms in quite different ways.
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1 Introduction
Venture capital and initial public offerings (IPOs) are closely inter-
related. Venture capitalists crucially rely on the IPO market as an
exit channel. It is often argued that the venture capital industry
can not survive without a viable IPO market (see e.g. Black/ Gilson
(1998)). Due to the fact that venture capital financing is a temporary
engagement in the respective portfolio firm,1 exiting is decisive for the
venture capitalist (VC) and the expectation of potential exit pathways
governs the behavior of VCs during the investment phase (see Cum-
ming (2002)). VCs disinvest their most promising and profitable firms
via an IPO. On the contrary, venture capital serves as a catalyst for
IPOs. Without firms that want to issue equity, IPO markets would
obviously lack supply. Since VCs are intermediaries specialized in
nurturing young (innovative) firms, a viable venture capital industry
“feeds” the IPO market.
Under these circumstances it is important to understand the role
venture capitalists play with respect to the market performance (around
and after the IPO) of their portfolio firms. There are a number of
studies analyzing the impact of venture capital on underpricing and
long-run returns. Our analysis differs from existing ones by looking
into the differences between different types of VCs. The starting point
of our analysis is the observation that VCs differ considerably in their
objectives, track records, and governance structures. We conclude
that different VCs resolve informational asymmetries and incentive
problems to a different degree. Our working hypothesis is that these
differences have a decisive impact on the market performance of the
respective portfolio firms. So it turns out to be quite useful to split up
1This can be seen as a mechanism to resolve informational asymmetry and incentive prob-
lems between the venture capitalist and its investors (see e.g. Gompers/ Lerner (1999b)). It is
institutionalized in that venture capital funds are typically organized as closed-end funds.
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the group of venture-backed firms, which in other studies were treated
as more or less homogenous. A natural playing field for such analysis
is the German venture capital and IPO market, with its wide variety
of different types of VCs2 active there. In order to pursue our goal,
we hand-collected a data base of all IPOs on the Neuer Markt during
the period 1997-2002.3
Our main results are as follows: We find significant differences
among different types of VCs with respect to the post-IPO market
performance. It turns out that firms backed by independent VCs
perform significantly better than firms of other VCs or non venture-
backed ones. Firms backed by public VCs (only a small group of
firms) underperform relative to their counterparts. In addition, we
find that independent VCs have a significant impact on the reduction
of firm-specific volatility. Thus, independent VCs bring about higher
(relative) post-IPO returns and less risk. This result is robust across
various methodological approaches and specifications. The fact that
this could occur (implying that market participants did not anticipate
this development) can be interpreted as a clear sign of the immaturity
of the market. Thus, we expect that such abnormalities will tend to
go away as the market grows older and becomes more established.
Following Rock (1986), quite a substantial body of research has
looked into the impact of venture capital on the degree of underpricing.
Studies investigating the effect of venture capital do not show a clear-
cut picture. In an early study, Megginson/ Weiss (1991) stress the
certification role of venture capital. They find a negative impact of
venture capital on underpricing. Barry et al. (1990) show, by looking
2Independent VCs, bank-dependent VCs, public VCs, and corporate VCs, young and experi-
enced VCs, international and national VCs, etc.
3Neuer Markt was founded in March 1997 and closed in June 2003. However, in 2003 there
were no IPOs in this market segment. A restructuring of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange led to a
transfer of firms from the Neuer Markt to other market segments.
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at a sample of venture-backed IPOs, that a higher monitoring effort by
VCs leads to less underpricing. Ljungqvist (1999) and Smart/ Zutter
(2003) challenge this view by analyzing US data. Ljungqvist (1999)
relates the degree of underpricing to the behavior of old shareholders
in general and not to the role of VCs per se. Smart/ Zutter (2003) find
more underpricing with venture-backed firms than with non venture-
backed ones. In a study of the German IPO market (using, by and
large, a very similar data set to ours), Franzke (2001) finds, too, that
venture-backed IPOs are more underpriced than non venture-backed
IPOs.
On the other hand, several studies have addressed the post-IPO
performance. Their message, however, is ambiguous: positive, neu-
tral, and negative influences by venture capital financing can all be
observed. Doukas/ Gonenc (2001) do not find any impact of ven-
ture capital on long-run performance. Brav/ Gompers (1997) show
that, in the US from 1975-1992, venture-backed IPOs outperformed
non venture-backed IPOs when measured via equal weighted returns.
In their study, this outperformance cannot be confirmed using other
methods. Audretsch/ Lehmann (2002) analyze the survival of compa-
nies on the Neuer Markt and find that the likelihood of firm survival
decreases as the ownership share of the group of VCs increases, which
indicates a negative effect on the part of venture capital.
None of the above mentioned studies, however, splits up the group
of venture capitalists by looking into the effects of different types of
VCs. Recently, Rindermann (2003) has distinguished between differ-
ent types of VCs (public, bank-dependent and independent; national
and international) in his analysis of the operating and market perfor-
mance of IPOs in Germany, France, and the UK. He uses a differ-
ent sample (only 1997 - 1999) and different methodologies from those
employed in our study. In line with our results, he finds a positive
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impact of international VCs and a negative influence of public VCs on
the stock price performance (using three-year “wealth relatives” with
NEMAX All Share Index as a benchmark).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section tenders a short
historical and structural overview of the German venture capital and
IPO markets. In this setting, our data set is described and some
descriptive statistics are given. The third section analyzes the impact
of different types of VCs on the post-IPO performance and contains
the main body of our analysis. There, we address the post-IPO returns
as well as the post-IPO volatility of share prices. In a first step, we
use a cross-section analysis to address the determinants of post-IPO
performance over a two-year period. In a second step, a matching
approach is used to investigate post-IPO returns. In a final step in
the third section, we consider the post-IPO idiosyncratic volatility of
returns and the influence of different types of VCs on this volatility.
The fourth section is devoted to analysis of underpricing in Germany’s
Neuer Markt in terms of the VCs’ impact. The last section states our
conclusions.
2 Structure of the German Venture Capital and
IPO Market
Before delving into the details of our analysis, a short overview of the
German venture capital and IPO markets will provide some insights
helpful for our further analysis.
2.1 Structure and History
One of the prime characteristics of the German venture capital and
IPO markets is that the main developments occurred in rather recent
times. Before 1990 only a few venture capitalists existed. These few
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were mainly quasi-public agencies which were established to promote
regional policies (the Mittelsta¨ndische Beteiligungsgesellschaften). In
the period from 1965 to 1985 a number of firms entered the German
market, concentrating mainly, however, on later-stage investing. As
early as the 1980s, an attempt to initiate early-stage venture capital
in Germany failed badly (see Becker/ Hellmann (2000) for details).
This experiment, initiated in 1975 by the German government with
support from the domestic banking industry, led the main financial
institutions to conclude that venture capital and private equity were
not part of their (core) business. The financial system was dominated
by the banking industry which gave (or did not give) credit to young
innovative firms. Access to organized capital markets was definitely
an exception. Only few firms (mainly established, medium- and large-
sized firms) undertook an IPO. In the period between 1970 and 1996,
no more than 301 IPOs took place in Germany.
Until the 1990s the venture capital industry in Germany grew rather
slowly. This changed quite drastically in the 1990s. The first push
came through reunification, leading to the establishment of a private
equity and venture capital market especially in East Germany. These
operations were clearly driven by subsidies and dominated by public
agencies (theMittelsta¨ndische Beteiligungsgesellschaften). The second
push occurred after 1995 and was paralleled by establishment of the
Neuer Markt in 1997. The growth rates of venture capital activities
(either measured by capital invested or by the establishment of venture
capital firms) accelerated substantially (see Figure 1).
Starting in 1997 with 11 initial public offerings, the Neuer Markt
went through an unprecedented growth period. 41 IPOs in 1998 were
followed by 130 IPOs in 1999. This number was even exceeded in
2000, the absolute peak of the market, with 133 IPOs. But already
in the second half of 2000, market conditions deteriorated and market
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valuations went down, making IPOs more and more difficult to bring
off. This was reflected by the drastic slow-down in the number of IPOs:
In 2001 only 11 firms went public. In 2002 the situation became even
more extreme, with only a single firm making it on the Neuer Markt.
This was the last firm with an IPO on the Neuer Markt.
IPOs on Germany’s Neuer Markt took place in a setting of pro-
nounced volatility in share prices. The market development can be
split into three parts (see Table 1). In the first one, the initial phase,
share prices moved steadily upward. The second one, a hot issue pe-
riod in 1999 and 2000, combined exploding share prices with a large
number of IPOs. The last period was characterized by a rapid decline
in share prices associated with a deterioration of the IPO-activity and
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several cases of fraud, which led finally to the closing-down of the
Neuer Markt in June 2003.
Table 1: Market development (1997-2003)
This table shows broad market development in terms of the level of NEMAX All Share Index at
the end of each quarter.
Q/Year 03/97 06/97 09/97 12/97 03/98 06/98 09/98 12/98 03/99 06/99 09/99 12/99 03/00
Nemax 606 786 942 1000 2182 2333 2110 2745 3242 3412 2680 4572 6629
Q/Year 06/00 09/00 12/00 03/01 06/01 09/01 12/01 03/02 06/02 09/02 12/02 03/03 06/03
Nemax 5369 4875 2743 1684 1503 843 1095 1029 664 389 405 385 517
For a while the Neuer Markt seemed to have resolved the exit prob-
lem of venture capital firms. According to our definition,4 123 of the
327 IPOs on the Neuer Markt were venture-backed. The boom in IPO
activity was accompanied by a large inflow of capital into the venture
capital market. This also led to the creation of many new venture
capital firms as well as to the entrance of a considerable number of
VCs from abroad into the German market (either through takeovers
of local VCs or via establishment of local branches in Germany). By
and large, it is fair to state that the German venture capital indus-
try is quite a young one, with not many portfolio managers having
experience in the industry exceeding five years.
For our purpose it is crucial that, due to a number of special in-
fluences in the German venture capital market, we distinguish a wide
variety of VC-types (and thereby governance structures). First, tra-
ditionally and as a result of overall economic policy, there is a large
proportion of venture capital organizations which are basically owned
or controlled by the state or public agencies. We will refer to these
VCs as public VCs, since their main objective, in most cases, is not
maximization of returns for their investors but rather the promotion
of local firms. In any case, their concentration on profit maximization
4See the next subsection for details.
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is much less pronounced than is the case with the independent VCs.
Second, as a result of the rapid growth of the venture capital market,
a considerable proportion of independent VCs are from abroad; thus
they have a quite different governance structure, corporate culture,
and track record than their public, bank-dependent, and corporate
counterparts. These differences are e.g. also reflected in the design
of contracts with their portfolio firms (see for evidence in this respect
Bascha/ Walz (2002)) as well as in their pre-IPO investment behavior
and exit strategies (see Tykvova´ (2004)). Third, in the 1990s many
players in the banking industry established their own private equity
and/ or venture capital subsidiaries. The portfolio managers of these
VCs act as employees of the mother company rather than as partners
of an independent VC. Further, there has been some discussion in the
literature about the motivation of banks to enter the venture capital
market with their own subsidiary (see e.g. Hellmann et al. (2003)).
All this makes investigating the impact of bank-dependent VCs on
their portfolio firms (in the course of an IPO) worthwhile. Finally, we
observe several corporate VCs.
In contrast to many other countries, other types of VCs than the
independent ones have a considerable market share in Germany. This
is especially true for the public ones. Despite this fact, the proportion
of public VCs in our IPO sample is rather small. The main reason
for this is that we focus on the lead VCs, whereas public VCs often
syndicate with other VCs, leaving the leadership with their syndica-
tion partner. In addition, public VCs often invest in firms for which
other exit strategies than IPOs clearly predominate. That is, the en-
trepreneurs do not consider the IPO as an interesting exit strategy in
the first place, and make sure that they are able to pursue other exit
strategies (mainly buying back the firm). In addition, due to their
specific structure in which profit maximization and the building-up of
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reputation are not the chief targets, public VCs are not that interested
in IPOs themselves. This is reflected in the actual exit strategies of
firms financed by public VCs (see BVK (2002) for the exit behavior
of the Mittelsta¨ndische Beteiligungsgesellschaften5).
We use these observations as the main starting point of our anal-
ysis, namely to look into the impact of different types of VCs on the
performance of firms around and after the IPO. To a certain extent
this wide variety of types of venture capital firms is reflected in our
sample of venture-backed IPOs.
2.2 The Data Set
Our analysis is based on a unique hand-collected database of IPOs
on Germany’s Neuer Markt. We considered only “real” IPOs. Thus,
we excluded firms that were listed on another exchange when going
public on the Neuer Markt. The data were obtained from several
sources. From the Deutsche Bo¨rse AG we received the following data:
date of IPO, offer price, first price, issue size, classification of the
industry, names of Designated Sponsors6, and shareholder structure
immediately after IPO. The information on the duration of the ven-
ture capital financing before IPO, the firm age and size, the name(s)
of the lead underwriter(s), the shareholder structure (prior to and im-
mediately after IPO) and the book value at the IPO were collected
from the listing prospectuses of the companies. When possible, these
data were cross-checked against information from the Deutsche Bo¨rse
AG.
We considered a firm as venture-backed if at least one of its share-
holders was affiliated with a national or an international venture cap-
552.2% (199) of the portfolio firms in 2001 were exited via a buy-back, 45.9% (175 firms) via
liquidation, and only 1 firm via an IPO.
6Each share on the Neuer Markt had to have at least two Designated Sponsors. Their main
task was to provide liquidity for the trading of this security.
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ital association and owned at least five percent of the pre-IPO equity.
In its short history, there were 327 IPOs on the Neuer Markt. Accord-
ing to our definition, 123 of them were venture-backed. The venture
capital firm which held the largest share of the equity prior to the IPO
was labelled the lead VC.
The data on venture capitalists (size, affiliation(s), age, type) were
compiled from the following sources: the VentureXpert database, the
directories of German, European, and US venture capital associations
(BVK, EVCA, NVCA), and Webpages of venture capital firms on the
Internet. We divided the venture-backed firms into four subgroups,
depending on the institutional affiliation of the lead VC. We distin-
guished between four types of VCs: public, bank- (or insurance-) de-
pendent, independent, and corporate. Further, we looked into whether
or not the headquarter of the lead venture capital firm was in Germany.
Of the 123 firms financed by venture capital ten were backed by a pub-
lic VC and 8 by a corporate VC whereas in 38 cases the lead VC was
a bank-dependent VC. The remaining 66 companies were backed by
an independent VC (see Table 2). One of the venture-backed firms,
VIVA, was removed from the sample since we have no information
on the names and respective shareholdings of the venture capitalists
financing this firm. In the entire sample we classified 61 cases as fi-
nanced by a lead VC from abroad, 50 of them being independent VCs,
nine bank-dependent VCs, and two corporate VCs. IPOs were rather
heavily concentrated in 1999 and 2000. For our purpose it is impor-
tant to note that, in the main, the different types of VCs do not show
any special concentration of their IPOs in a particular period or year;
thus they do not deviate from the overall trend.
We also collected data on the quality and experience of venture
capitalists, underwriters, and Designated Sponsors. The rank coeffi-
cient of a VC (between 1 and 5) was based equally on its size (funds
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Table 2: IPOs on Germany’s Neuer Markt over time
This table depicts the number of IPOs on the Neuer Markt, sorted
by year and type of VC.
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
∑
No. of IPOs 11 41 130 133 11 1 327
VC 7 15 45 53 3 0 123∗
INDEP 2 7 25 30 2 0 66
BANK 4 8 12 14 0 0 38
CORP 0 0 2 6 0 0 8
PUBL 1 0 6 2 1 0 10
∗This number includes VIVA, which was venture-backed. Since we do not
have any information on the lead VC (or its type) we excluded it from our
data sample.
under management) and its age. The rank of an underwriter (be-
tween 1 and 10) depended on his activities as the lead underwriter,
namely the number of new issues on the Neuer Markt and their vol-
ume in the previous year. The rank of a Designated Sponsor was
based equally on the number of his mandates on the Neuer Markt and
on his rating with the Deutsche Bo¨rse AG in the preceding period,
and was assigned quarterly. The reputation measures were designed
in the following way: the lower the number, the better the rank (thus
1 indicates the best rank).
The (performance) index (NEMAX All Share, DAX 100 ) returns
and the individual stock prices and dividends came from the Bloomberg
database. A few companies were not found in Bloomberg, so we used
Thomson Financial Datastream instead. For two firms, FOCUS Dig-
ital AG and RT-SET Real Time Synthesized Entertainment Technol-
ogy Ltd., we did not find data on their returns in either database. For
seven firms that went public later than March 2001 we have no data
on two-year-returns, because our time series on returns ends in March
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2003. Eight firms left the market within two years. We excluded one
particular outlier, EM.TV, from our calculations.7
Table 3 comprises our main variables and their abbreviations. All
financial data before 1999 were converted into Euros.
2.3 Some Descriptive Statistics
In order to give a first impression of the characteristics of IPOs of
the different types of VCs, Table 4 sets out the main variables and
relates them to the different types of VCs. The IPOs differ widely
sizewise in our sample. Small issues have to be compared to a few real
“heavy-weights” having a market value of a couple of billion Euros (up
to 43 billion Euros). Bank-dependent and public VCs were engaged
in significantly smaller issues (SIZE) from firms with a lower market
value (MV).
With respect to book-to-market ratios (BTM) we have 26 firms
with negative values. Since the interpretation of negative book-to-
market ratios might be problematic, in the following sections (3.3, 3.5
and 4) we calculate our regressions (i) using all observations, (ii) re-
moving the companies with negative book-to-market ratios from the
sample, and (iii) employing a dummy variable for negative/ positive
book-to-market ratios.8 On average, bank-dependent VCs show sig-
nificantly higher book-to-market ratios than their counterparts. On
the contrary, independent and corporate VCs concentrated mainly on
growth stocks.
The two-year abnormal returns (ABNORMAL2Y) vary widely as
well. Since we consider the difference between individual returns and
7This firm shows impressive returns in the two-year post-IPO period, but from then on it turns
out to be one of the most widely-discussed cases of fraud in the Neuer Markt. Since EM.TV
outperforms extremely all other firms, it would clearly dominate our estimations. In order to
exclude this particular influence, we decided to eliminate EM.TV from our sample.
8However, the results from approaches (ii), and (iii) do not considerably differ from (i).
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Table 3: List of variables used
MARKET
HOTISSUE One between March 1, 1999 and November 30, 2000; zero otherwise
MARKET2Y 2-year post-IPO NEMAX All Share buy-and-hold return
RECENT Underpricing of the five preceding new issues on the Neuer Markt
FIRM
ABNORMAL2Y RETURN2Y - MARKET2Y
AGE Firm age at IPO (in days)
BTM Book-to-market ratio (·10−6)
MV Market value at IPO (Mil. Euro)
RETURN2Y 2-year post-IPO buy-and-hold return
SIZE Issue size (based on offer price, in Euro)
UNDERPRICING (First price - offer price) / offer price
VENTURE CAPITALIST(S)
BANK One if the lead VC is a financial service / banking / insurance company
or their subsidiary, zero otherwise
CORP One if the lead VC is a corporate VC, zero otherwise
GERM One if the lead VC is from Germany, zero otherwise
INDEP One if the lead VC is an independent venture capital firm, zero otherwise
LOCK Extent of the lock-up by the group of venture capitalists
(% of their old shares retained beyond the IPO)
PREIPOLENGTH Duration of the pre-IPO venture capital equity financing (in days)
PUBL One if the lead VC is public, zero otherwise
RANK Rank of the lead VC, depending on its age and size;
range: 1 (highest rank) - 5 (lowest rank)
VC One if the firm is venture-backed, zero otherwise
OTHER MARKET PARTICIPANTS
DSRANK Rank of Designated Sponsors of a company (average), depending on
their rating and the number of companies they manage;
range: 1 (highest rank) - 10 (lowest rank)
UNDRANK Rank of lead underwriter of a company (if more lead underwriters:
the average of their rank), depending on the number of issues and
their volumes; range: 1 (highest rank) - 10 (lowest rank)
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Table 4: Realizations of main variables for different types of VCs
This table contains descriptive statistics of our main variables as well as tests on the equality of means
and medians of the variables for the respective groups and the rest. Before employing a t-test for the
respective means we test for equal variances. Rejecting the null hypothesis of equal variances at the 5%
significance level, we use a t-test with unequal variances; otherwise we use a t-test with equal variances
(in italics). Additionally employed is a nonparametric two-sample test on the equality of medians with
the test chi-squared statistic without a continuity correction and its p-value is reported.
The sample includes all venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs for the 1997-2002 period on the
Neuer Markt, Frankfurt. We excluded VIVA (all variables) and EM.TV (ABNORMAL2Y).
One, two, and three asterisks point to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. An asterisk in brackets
indicates significance at the 15 percent level.
Variable Subsample Observations Mean Minimum Maximum p-value p-value
(mean) (median)
MV NON-VC 204 561.8 26.0 42867.0
VC 122 251.9 29.0 1716.7 0.150(*) 0.492
INDEP 66 303.6 45.6 1716.7 0.300 0.270
BANK 38 183.5 60.1 632.9 0.053* 0.038**
CORP 8 285.5 68.0 996.3 0.345 0.152
PUBL 10 142.8 29.0 555.0 0.034** 0.054*
BTM NON-VC 204 26611 -272002 242827
VC 122 27292 -63831 131664 0.866 0.252
INDEP 66 20681 -63831 102144 0.090* 0.168
BANK 38 38659 -15466 131664 0.041** 0.016**
CORP 8 20681 5278 31455 0.117(*) 0.474
PUBL 10 33016 -12973 115958 0.602 0.199
BTM, positive NON-VC 190 30421 10 242827
VC 110 32154 76 131664 0.643 0.231
INDEP 56 27569 76 102144 0.319 0.374
BANK 37 40122 1188 131664 0.075* 0.022**
CORP 8 20681 5278 31455 0.013** 1.000
PUBL 9 38126 7197 115958 0.516 0.310
ABNORMAL2Y NON-VC 190 -0.092 -3.009 5.245
VC 118 0.290 -4.215 18.389 0.100* 0.348
INDEP 63 0.536 -2.017 18.389 0.099* 0.323
BANK 38 0.143 -3.989 8.803 0.779 1.000
CORP 8 0.015 -0.194 0.212 0.713 0.474
PUBL 9 -0.569 -4.215 0.495 0.251 0.735
UNDERPRICING NON-VC 204 0.473 -0.250 4.333
VC 122 0.510 -0.118 3.400 0.649 0.492
INDEP 66 0.506 -0.118 2.231 0.786 0.270
BANK 38 0.534 -0.077 3.400 0.668 0.730
CORP 8 0.255 0.000 1.000 0.091* 1.000
PUBL 10 0.653 0.000 2.061 0.459 1.000
PREIPOLENGTH VC 106 602 13 2990
INDEP 61 711 13 2412 0.020** 0.031**
BANK 31 410 22 2990 0.024** 0.019**
CORP 7 806 75 1726 0.325 0.241
PUBL 7 300 37 891 0.144(*) 0.241
SIZE (·106) NON-VC 203 83 8 3080
VC 121 58 10 302 0.148(*) 0.206
INDEP 65 68 14 302 0.612 0.018**
BANK 38 44 11 197 0.014** 0.167
CORP 8 86 41 219 0.615 0.004***
PUBL 10 25 10 58 0.000*** 0.054*
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the market return (NEMAX All Share Index), timing issues are po-
tentially eliminated. The remarkable differences in average abnormal
returns among venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs, as well
as for firms backed by independent VCs which turn out to be signif-
icant, already indicate that there are strong differences which might
also show up when controlling for other factors of influence. The UN-
DERPRICING variable displays mostly positive levels in some cases at
exorbitant levels. The univariate t-test, however, does not detect any
significant differences among the groups, with the exception of corpo-
rate VCs which exhibit on average a lower degree of underpricing for
their portfolio firms.
Our subsample of venture-backed firms contains quite different types
of venture capital financing arrangements. Obviously, some just rep-
resent bridge financing with a rather short period of engagement (rep-
resented by the PREIPOLENGTH variable) of the VC in the portfolio
firm. Especially bank-dependent and public VCs have on average a
short holding period. Thus, they often did not fit the role of an ac-
tive investor and monitor. The reverse is true for the independent
VCs, who have a significantly longer mean and median duration of
the pre-IPO financing.
Overall Table 4 reveals rather pronounced variations in the different
variables among the firms backed by different types of VCs.
3 Post-IPO Performance
3.1 Background
Starting with the analysis of Ritter (1991) and Loughran/ Ritter
(1995), the post-IPO performance of firms has attracted a lot of at-
tention. Since then, a number of papers have challenged the initial
findings by proposing different empirical techniques, without really
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being able to fully explain the underperformance puzzle. Brav/ Gom-
pers (1997) are the first to investigate the role of VCs in the long-
run market performance of IPOs. They show that the underperfor-
mance documented in the initial studies comes mainly from small,
non venture-backed IPOs. Thus, within the group of small compa-
nies, venture-backed firms are better prepared to perform well in the
aftermath of the IPO.
Venture capitalists, however, differ to a large extent and do rep-
resent a quite disperse group of financial intermediaries. Depending
on their main investor(s), we observe a wide heterogeneity of corpo-
rate governance as well as objectives and (in particular) experience
among VCs. This heterogeneity exists in most countries and is espe-
cially pronounced in the continental European economies, particularly
in Germany. The existence of a large public sector and an interven-
tionist culture led to the establishment of a considerable number of
public VCs. Given the country’s bank-dominated financial system, it
is not too surprising that commercial banks have created their own
venture capital funds, which played an important role in the German
venture capital market in the last couple of years. Finally, corporate
venture capitalists do exist in Germany. They are mainly subsidiaries
of their (industrial) mother companies and therefore often possess a
different legal and economic structure compared to their independent
counterparts.
In the following we will analyze the hypothesis that the different
objectives of the different types of VCs (see on this e.g. Hellmann et al.
(2003) and Gompers/ Lerner (2000)), as well as the diversity of these
VCs’ corporate governance (see Cumming (2000)) and experience (see
Tykvova´ (2003)), will have a significant impact on the post-IPO per-
formance of the firms they have taken public. Tykvova´ (2004) shows
that independent VCs in Germany typically exhibit more sophisti-
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cated investment patterns than do bank-dependent and public VCs.
Thus, these VCs are probably able to add more value to their portfo-
lio companies. We want to investigate whether investors assessed the
role played by the different types of VCs correctly. In this case, no
particular group should show a systematic over- or underperformance
when controlling for other effects.
We proceed in two steps. The first step is to investigate post-IPO
returns and ask, among other things, whether there are significant
differences between different types of VCs. The second step is to look
into the effect of VCs on IPO prices and post-IPO price fluctuations
from a different angle. We analyze the pricing precision of venture-
backed firms by looking at the post-IPO idiosyncratic volatility of
returns on firms backed by different VCs. In pursuit of our first step we
employ various techniques. First, we undertake a cross-section analysis
of post-IPO returns. Second, we employ a matching procedure for
purposes of comparing (abnormal) returns on similar firms. Carrying
out the second step, we take up an argument made by Neus/ Walz
(2002) on the basis of a theoretical analysis of the exit choices of VCs.
They argue that experienced VCs are able to price their portfolio
more precisely, leading to less volatility in the post-IPO market. This
finding essentially rests on the fact that experienced VCs can use the
reputation they have acquired as repeated players in the IPO market
to signal the quality of their firms. Thus, they are able to exit at the
“true” prices leading to less post-IPO volatility of returns.
Due to our data set and the specific situation of the German ven-
ture capital market, we concentrate on a two-year timespan after IPO.
Since the bulk of all IPOs took place in 2000, a longer time period
would exclude a large number of IPOs. On the other hand, a shorter
timespan conflicts with our goal of investigating the long-run per-
formance of shares in the post-IPO period. Accordingly, due to the
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specific constraints of our data set, we deviate from the convention of
researchers using US data to look at three or even five year returns
(see e.g. Ritter (1991) and Brav/ Gompers (1997)).
3.2 Methodological Issues
A growing body of research analyzes the methodology of performance
measurement and addresses the questions of how risk and return should
be quantified appropriately and how well-specified test statistics should
be designed. Ritter/ Welch (2002) argue that many of the phenomena
found in the IPO-literature depend upon the time period examined.
Most authors agree that the result of the performance measurement
is always conditional on the underlying model (e.g. Brav/ Gompers
(1997) and Gompers/ Lerner (2003)) and the statistical tests (e.g.
Barber/ Lyon (1997), Lyon et al. (1999) or Kothari/ Warner (1997))
used. Therefore, we implement several methods to check whether our
results are robust. In the following, the main findings from the recent
literature will be summarized and reasons for the approaches used in
this paper will be given.
The early research on post-IPO stock performance in the US mar-
ket (and almost all studies for Germany) compares returns on newly
listed firms to returns on market-wide indices. The basic shortcom-
ing of this approach is that it implies for all firms a same average
systematic risk (beta equal to one) that is constant over time. A lot
of studies that use this methodology exist for the German data, ana-
lyzing performance of IPOs before the Neuer Markt was introduced.
Two examples of English-written studies are Ljungqvist (1997) and
Bessler/ Thies (2002).
More sophisticated methods that control for risk have been de-
veloped and used (for the US data). Beginning with Ritter (1991)
various matching approaches have been introduced, putting sample
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firms together with either single control firms (matching one-to-one)
or with portfolios. In the earlier studies, firms were matched on size
(Loughran/ Ritter (1995)) or size and industry (Ritter (1991)), in later
studies on size and book-to-market ratio (Brav/ Gompers (1997) or
Brav et al. (2000)). Barber/ Lyon (1997) have shown that matching
on a one-to-one basis is the most adequate benchmark concept. It
does not suffer from the rebalancing and the skewness bias (as meth-
ods using equally weighted portfolios do) since both the sample and
control firm returns are calculated without rebalancing and without
averaging. Our one-to-one matching approach in section 3.4 elimi-
nates also the new listing bias, since both the sample and control firm
are listed at “nearly” the same time. We use different approaches to
match firms to control firms. In each of these approaches, sample firms
are matched to control firms on the basis of specified firm character-
istics (market value of equity and book-to-market ratio at IPO) and
the IPO timing. However, matching one-to-one induces the noise of
selecting potential outliers, particularly if samples are small. Thus we
match, additionally, single sample firms to portfolios instead of single
firms and obtain similar results.
Alternatively to matching, time-series three-factor models designed
by Fama/ French (1993) are commonly used to analyze the post-IPO
performance (e.g. Brav/ Gompers (1997) and Brav et al. (2000)).
Here, portfolio returns are regressed on the market (beta) factor, size
and book-to-market effects. Some studies consider additional factors,
e.g. leverage and liquidity (see Eckbo/ Norli (2000)) or the previous
return (see Brav et al. (2000)). Due to a short horizon and lack of
data on factors for Germany, we do not perform factor model analy-
sis. Instead, we employ in section 3.3 a cross-section analysis similar
to Ritter (1991). We regress firm returns on the market return, various
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control variables (size, book-to-market ratio, age, industry dummies)
and VC characteristics.
In most of the analyses in the paper, we exclude firms that left the
market during the period under consideration. We address the issue of
the potential survivor bias in section 3.4, where we include the (eight)
firms which left the market on the basis of their one-year return. The
results did not change very much compared to the matching without
these firms. Last but not least, the studies on performance often
suffer from bad test statistics. However, using matching one-to-one
as in section 3.4, the test statistics are well specified (see Barber/
Lyon (1997)). We address this problem in section 3.3 too. We assume
heteroscedasticity and employ corrected t-test statistics.
In this paper, the window for the measurement of the performance
is two years. Post-IPO returns are typically measured as buy-and-
hold (abnormal) returns. In section 3.4, we calculate the differences
between the VC-types based on both the buy-and-hold returns and the
wealth relatives. However, no considerable differences can be detected.
3.3 Cross-Section Analysis of Returns
In a first step, we explore the determinants of the post-IPO returns in
a cross-section analysis. We define performance (rt) as:
rt =
Pt+2 +Dt+2 − Pt
Pt
,
with Pt (Pt+2) being the share price at IPO (two years after IPO).
Additionally the dividends during the two-year period (Dt+2) are taken
into account. Our ultimate goal is to look into potential effects of
different types of VCs on the returns on their portfolio firms. In order
to isolate these effects, we include various variables which control e.g.
for size, age, and industry (9 industry dummies) of the particular firm.
We use the market value of the firms at the time of the IPO as proxy
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for firm size. The book-to-market ratio (at the time of IPO) serves as
an indicator for the market expectation of future growth potentials.
Market return (measured as the two-year return on the NEMAX All
Share Index) in the corresponding period takes market developments
into account.
Table 5 delineates our results. We estimated seven models which
differ with respect to sample size as well as variables included. The
basic model (Model I) embraces the entire sample and includes, besides
the main control variables, dummy variables depicting the different
types of VCs. This model already reveals the main pattern, which
turns out to be rather robust throughout the various specifications.
We find in Model I a significant positive effect of INDEP on two-
year returns. That is, firms backed by independent VCs performed
significantly (at the ten percent level) better than their counterparts
which were either backed by other VCs or not venture-backed at all.
We find negative but insignificant coefficients for the PUBL and CORP
variable. Our data also indicate that firms backed by bank-dependent
VCs tend to perform relatively better than all other firms. This effect
is, however, not significant. With respect to the control variables,
we find a highly significant positive impact on the part of market
returns. The remaining control variables are insignificant. In Model
II we show that venture-backed companies perform generally better
than non venture-backed companies.
In the third and fourth step (Models III and IV) we also include
a variable measuring the national decent of the VC. This variable
(GERM) indicates that firms backed by non-German VCs do outper-
form the others. This might be attributable to the longer track record
of international VCs, an influence which is underestimated by the cap-
ital markets. The inclusion of other market participants (namely the
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Table 5: Cross-section regressions of two-year post-IPO returns
This table reports the results of different cross-section OLS regressions of two-year post-IPO re-
turns.
The sample includes all venture-backed and all non venture-backed IPOs for the 1997-2002 period
on the Neuer Markt, Frankfurt. We excluded two firms, VIVA and EM.TV.
t-statistics (corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White-sandwich estimator) are in
parentheses. Industry dummies are used as control variables, but not reported in the table. The
coefficient of the constant used in the estimations is also omitted.
One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. An asterisk in
brackets points to significance at the 15 percent level.
I: II: III: IV: V: VI: VII:
Full Sample VC-Sample
and and other and and and
VCs market hot issue national reputation
participants origin
MV (∗10−6) 2.4 1.6 1.7 2.3 -1912 -2073 -1783
(0.26) (0.18) (0.20) (0.26) (−1.94)∗ (−2.02) ∗ ∗ (−1.61)(∗)
BTM (∗10−6) 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.6 10.3 8.4 9.8
(0.65) (0.64) (0.55) (0.36) (1.53)(∗) (1.26) (1.57)(∗)
MARKET2Y 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5
(2.76)∗∗∗ (2.79)∗∗∗ (2.52) ∗ ∗ (1.90)∗ (2.92)∗∗∗ (2.94)∗∗∗ (2.56) ∗ ∗
AGE (∗10−6) −6.3 −6.3 −18.0 2.5 −6.2 −4.6 −22.0
(−0.22) (−0.22) (−0.66) (0.10) (−0.15) (−0.11) (−0.60)
BANK 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 −0.3 −0.7
(0.44) (1.72)∗ (1.41) (0.47) (−0.44) (−1.25)
CORP −0.01 0.5 0.3 0.8
(−0.03) (1.64)(∗) (0.97) (1.14)
INDEP 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.4 0.2 0.1
(1.73)∗ (1.79)∗ (1.90)∗ (1.68)∗ (0.60) (0.30)
PUBL −0.5 0.3 0.04 −0.6 −0.9
(−0.98) (0.57) (0.07) (−0.78) (−1.27)
GERM −0.7 −0.5 −0.7











# of obs. 308 308 307 308 118 118 117
R2 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.48 0.49 0.50
Additionally to the results presented in this table, we calculated all models alternatively (a) removing companies
with negative book-to-market ratios and (b) employing a dummy variable for negative/ positive book-to-market
ratio. The results did not differ considerably.
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Designated Sponsors and the lead underwriters) or adding the HO-
TISSUE variable does not really change the picture.
If we consider only our VC-Sample (Models V - VII) and thereby
compare the different types of VCs with each other, the overall picture
is not altered. Firms backed by independent VCs outperform firms
financed by other VCs (see Model V). If we take GERM (see Model
VI) or RANK (see Model VII) into account, most of the effect of
INDEP is picked up by these variables. Companies backed by foreign
VCs or by VCs with a large reputation perform better.
The overall picture is quite clear-cut. There are significant differ-
ences between the two-year performance of firms backed by different
VCs and non venture-backed IPOs. In the group of the venture-backed
firms we find a consistent pattern. Firms financed by independent VCs
do significantly better (or, given the overall market trend in our pe-
riod of investigation, not worse) than the other firms in the Neuer
Markt. If we take the national origin of the VCs into account, we find
that firms backed by international VCs (who mostly are independent)
tend to perform significantly better than others. Further, a higher
reputation on the part of the lead VC leads to a better performance.
Obviously this effect, which probably results from the experience of
international, independent, and high-quality VCs as monitors, is not
discounted by the market participants reflecting the potential ineffi-
ciencies of a young capital market.
3.4 Matching Returns ‘One-to-One’
In the next step, we match similar firms on a one-to-one basis (using
eight different approaches) and compare their returns. In order to deal
with the differences between venture and non venture-backed compa-
nies and among different types of VCs, we divide the sample into six
groups (VC, NON-VC, PUBL, BANK, INDEP, and CORP). For each
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firm from a certain group (e.g. PUBL), we choose a control firm from
another group (e.g. NON-VC). The differences between the matching
methods used can be found in (a) the period in which the (abnormal)
returns are measured and (b) the restrictions posed on the group of
potential matching firms. For each of the eight approaches, the most
similar firms are put together and their return differences analyzed.
The “similarity” is measured in terms of size, book-to-market ratio,
and IPO timing. We invariably use two-year buy-and-hold returns
(BHR). The results are depicted in Table 6. The superior perfor-
mance of venture-backed firms, particularly of the group financed by
independent VCs, is confirmed. Moreover, firms backed by a public
VC perform significantly worse than companies from other groups.
We use two different observation periods. In (1) - (4), we follow
each issuing firm over two years from its IPO date. We compare the
abnormal return (= firm return minus NEMAX All Share return) on
the sample and the control firm and calculate the difference (matched
return difference, MRD):
MRD = ABNORMALi − ABNORMALc.
Here, the periods in which returns on the firm i and c are measured
may slightly differ because of different IPO dates. However, the inclu-
sion of the market return should control for this effect.
In (5) - (8), the measurement period is exactly the same for both
the sample and the control firm. It starts three weeks after the IPO of
the firm with the later offering (time t) and lasts for two years (time
t + 2).9 We compare the return on the sample and the control firm
and calculate the difference (MRD):
MRD = (BHR between t and t+ 2)i − (BHR between t and t+ 2)c.
9The reason for not starting at the date of the later IPO is the high volatility immediately after
the listing.
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Table 6: Mean return differences between sample and matching firms
This table reports the means of the MRD between a sample firm i and a control firm c for venture-backed
firms (VC), non venture-backed firms (NON-VC) and firms backed by different types of VCs (PUBL,
BANK, INDEP, CORP). The sample includes all venture-backed and all non venture-backed IPOs for
the 1997-2002 period on the Neuer Markt, Frankfurt. We excluded two firms, VIVA and EM.TV.
For (1) to (4): ABNORMALi −ABNORMALc.
For (5) to (8): (buy-and-hold return between t and t+2)i− (buy-and-hold return between t and t+2)c.
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Number of observations is in italics.
“+” indicates that the difference in means of the MRD between a certain group (VC, NON-VC, PUBL,
etc.) and the rest is significant (a standard two-sided t-test allowing for unequal variances)
“*” indicates that the difference in medians of the MRD between a certain group (VC, NON-VC, PUBL,
etc.) and the rest is significant (a nonparametric two-sample test on the equality of medians with the
test chi-squared statistic without a continuity correction)
“†” indicates that the mean MRD in a certain group is significantly different from 0 (a standard two-sided
t-test)
+++, ***, † † † indicate significance at the 1% level; ++, **, †† indicate significance at the 5% level;
+, *, † indicate significance at the 10% level; (+), (*), (†) indicate significance at the 15% level
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ABNORMAL RETURNS, DIFFERENT PERIODS
VC NON-VC PUBL BANK INDEP CORP
-0.55 * -0.44 (*) 0.21 ** -0.08
(1) - - (1.06) (3.32) (1.88) (0.35)
9 38 63 8
-0.19 + * 0.45 0.30 (*) -0.20 +
(2) - - (0.52) (2.43) (1.92) (0.52)
9 37 62 8
0.29 + (†) -0.08 + -0.20 0.45 0.30 0.00
(3) (1.95) (1.55) (0.55) (2.39) (1.92) (0.18)
117 190 9 38 62 8
0.29 +++ (†) -0.54 +++ † † † -0.20 * 0.45 + 0.30 ++ 0.00 (+)
(4) (1.95) (2.51) (0.55) (2.39) (1.92) (0.18)
117 190 9 38 62 8
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RETURNS, SAME PERIOD
VC NON-VC PUBL BANK INDEP CORP
-0.29 -0.50 + (*) 0.25 ++ * † 0.00
(5) - - (0.84) (2.18) (0.97) (0.10)
9 38 59 8
-0.15 + ** 0.67 0.18 (*) -0.08 (+)
(6) - - (0.50) (3.07) (1.47) (0.35)
9 36 59 7
0.31 + † -0.07 + -0.15 ** 0.60 0.24 0.00
(7) (1.96) (1.68) (0.53) (2.88) (1.42) (0.12)
112 185 9 37 59 7
0.31 +++ † -0.53 +++ † † † -0.15 ** 0.60 + 0.24 ++ 0.00
(8) (1.96) (2.72) (0.53) (2.88) (1.42) (0.12)
112 185 9 37 59 7
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To check whether the disparities are robust over different control
firms’ samples, we place varying restrictions on the group of match-
ing firms. In (1) and (5), we match venture-backed firms only to
venture-backed firms financed by a different type of venture capitalist.
Thus, a firm backed e.g. by a public VC may be matched with a firm
backed by a corporate, bank-dependent, or independent VC. Using
this approach, the differences between different types of VCs can be
targeted. In (2) and (6), we compare firms backed by different types
of VCs to non venture-backed firms. Thus, each venture-backed firm
is matched to the most similar non venture-backed firm. In (3) and
(7), the group of potential matching firms includes all firms, with the
exception of firms backed by the same type of VC as the sample firm.
Thus, a firm backed e.g. by a public VC may be matched to a firm
backed by a corporate, bank-dependent or independent VC or to a non
venture-backed firm. In (4) and (8), the group of matching firms is
restricted for the non venture-backed sample firms as well, since they
are matched only to venture-backed firms. The group of potential
matching firms for venture-backed firms includes all firms, with the
exception of firms backed by the same type of VC as the sample firm.
As a consequence of this design, in (1), (2), (5) and (6) the group of
sample firms consists only of venture-backed firms, whereas in (3), (4),
(7) and (8) non venture-backed firms are included in the analysis as
well.
Having defined the group of potential matching firms (e.g. non
venture-backed firms in (2) and (6)) for each sample firm i, we search
within this group for such companies as went public in a period that
started three months before and ended three month after the IPO of
the sample firm i. Within this restricted group of potential matching







where MVaverage and BTMaverage are measured over the whole sample
of 326 firms.
The mean differences in returns between sample and control firms
in each group (mean MRD) are depicted in Table 6. We have 117
(112) pairs of matched firms in the first group (VC), 190 (185) firms
in the group NON-VC, 9 firms in the group PUBL, 36-38 firms in the
group BANK, 59-63 firms in the group INDEP, and 7-8 firms in the
group CORP. The reason for the difference in the number of matched
pairs for different approaches is that in some cases no matching firm
could have been identified, since the set of potential matching firms
was empty. For seven firms that went public after April 1, 2001, we did
not have data on two-year-returns, because our time series on returns
ended in March 2003.10 Eight firms left the market during the two
years after their IPO. These firms (two of them venture-backed) are
not considered in Table 6.
Venture-backed firms perform significantly better than non venture-
backed firms. This result is robust over the various matching ap-
proaches. The mean returns on firms backed by public VCs are always
lower than the mean returns on their matched firms. The difference
in (abnormal) returns is particularly large when we match publicly-
backed firms only to firms financed by another type of VC (approaches
(1) and (5)). On the whole, the difference in medians of the MRD is
almost always highly statistically significant and negative for public
VCs compared to other groups. The mean returns on firms backed by
an independent VC are always higher than the mean returns on their
matched firms. When we match only within venture-backed firms,
firms backed by an independent VC are the only group that has a
positive mean MRD on average. The mean MRD on firms backed
10Logically, for (5) - (8), where the measurement period starts three weeks after the IPO of the
firm with the later IPO, the samples are smaller than in (1) - (4), where the two-year timespan
begins at the IPO date.
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by a corporate or a bank-dependent VC vary from approach to ap-
proach. Compared to other venture-backed firms, companies backed
by a bank-dependent VC have (significantly) lower returns, while com-
panies backed by a corporate VC have approximately the same returns
on average.
We carried out three further analyses to check the robustness of our
results. First, we included firms that left the market during the period
under consideration on the basis of their one-year returns so as to
control for the potential survivor bias. Second, we matched firms on a
portfolio basis instead of on a one-to-one basis. Third, we used wealth
relatives instead of the BHR. In all these alternative approaches, the
positive impact of venture capital-backing, particularly of independent
venture capital, on performance was confirmed. On the other hand,
the inferior performance of companies backed by public VCs remained
as well. The results are not reported here.
3.5 Post-IPO Return Volatility
In this section, we look at the differences in the two-year post-IPO
idiosyncratic volatility of returns. In doing so, we want to explore
whether venture capitalists (and different types of venture capital-
ists) are better able to overcome potential informational asymmetries
with respect to firm characteristics. Here the basic idea is that ven-
ture capitalists can use their (current and/ or future) reputation to
price the shares of their firms better than in the case of non venture-
backed firms. This implies that, in the aftermath of IPO, there will be
less adjustment towards the “true” market price, thus leading to less
post-IPO fluctuation (see Neus/ Walz (2002) for a detailed theoretical
model of this hypothesis).
In Table 7 we regress the two-year post-IPO idiosyncratic volatil-
ity (resulting from the CAPM) on some further variables concerning
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Table 7: Cross-section regressions of the idiosyncratic volatility
This table depicts the results of cross-section OLS regressions of idiosyncratic volatility (·105),
calculated on the basis of the CAPM.
The sample includes all venture-backed and all non venture-backed IPOs for the 1997-2002
period on the Neuer Markt, Frankfurt. We excluded two firms, VIVA and EM.TV.
t-statistics (corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White-sandwich estimator) are in
parentheses. Industry dummies are used as control variables, but not reported in the table.
The coefficient of the constant used in the estimations is also omitted.
One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. An asterisk
in brackets points to significance at the 15 percent level.
I: II: III: IV: V: VI:
Full Sample VC-Sample
and other and and other and and
market VCs market national reputation
participants participants origin
MV(∗10−4) −6.33 −1.57 −6.28 −7.12 −42.66 −22.24
(−0.40) (−0.10) (−0.40) (−0.05) (−0.28) (−0.14)
BTM(∗10−4) 1.22 1.19 1.25 0.82 1.06 1.12
(2.90)∗∗∗ (3.23)∗∗∗ (2.97)∗∗∗ (1.00) (1.42) (1.51)(∗)
AGE(∗10−4) −8.90 −12.41 −8.89 −8.42 −8.53 −9.53
(−2.85)∗∗∗ (−4.32)∗∗∗ (−2.81)∗∗∗ (−1.99) ∗ ∗ (−2.06) ∗ ∗ (−2.29) ∗ ∗
SIZE(∗10−10) −20.50 −109.00 −19.90 262.00 484.00 287.00
(−0.09) (−0.50) (−0.09) (0.36) (0.67) (0.39)
BANK −21.74 −13.68
(−3.51)∗∗∗ (−2.45) ∗ ∗
CORP −13.82 −12.33 −0.59
(−2.08) ∗ ∗ (−1.77)∗ (−0.08)
INDEP −27.60 −18.28 −7.28
(−4.50)∗∗∗ (−3.47)∗∗∗ (−1.65)∗
PUBL −23.06 −19.21 −6.18







LOCK 0.29 0.20 0.27 0.21 0.22 0.20
(4.19)∗∗∗ (3.20)∗∗∗ (3.84)∗∗∗ (3.06)∗∗∗ (3.18)∗∗∗ (3.06)∗∗∗
DSRANK −3.24 −3.04 −3.13 −3.47
(−5.03)∗∗∗ (−3.42)∗∗∗ (−3.40)∗∗∗ (−3.81)∗∗∗
UNDRANK 0.36 −0.38 −0.38 −0.61
(0.57) (−0.38) (−0.36) (−0.60)
HOTISSUE −10.15 −6.27 −9.74 −4.80 −4.82 −6.00
(−2.49) ∗ ∗ (−1.77)∗ (−2.42) ∗ ∗ (−0.85) (−0.92) (−1.13)
# of obs. 320 314 320 117 117 117
R2 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.33 0.32 0.32
Additionally to the results presented in this table, we calculated all models alternatively (a) removing companies
with negative book-to-market ratios and (b) employing a dummy variable for negative/ positive book-to-market
ratio. The results did not differ considerably.
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the firm characteristics, the market situation, the rank of Designated
Sponsors and the lead underwriter(s), the VCs’ characteristics and in-
volvement. We estimate six models which differ with respect to sample
size and included variables. Several of our variables help explain part
of the idiosyncratic volatility.
In general, participation by venture capitalists decreases the volatil-
ity (see Models I - III) as implied by Neus/ Walz (2002). However,
the venture capitalists’ impact depends on their type and the extent
of their lock-up. Within the VC-Sample we find, in line with our pre-
vious results, a positive impact of independent VCs (see Model IV).
Companies backed by independent VCs show a relatively lower id-
iosyncratic volatility than do other firms (generating a higher return
at the same time). Moreover, as expected, shares of foreign VCs and
VCs with a better (=lower) rank, which also perform better, are less
volatile (see Models V and VI).
As short-term investors, venture capitalists try to divest themselves
of their shares rather quickly. This leads to an increase in the volatility
of these shares. Thus, the larger the lock-up by venture capitalists is,
the higher the idiosyncratic volatility. Younger firms, which typically
are more risky than their older counterparts, show a higher idiosyn-
cratic volatility.
Two results from Table 7 contradict our predictions: The finding
of a positive impact of the book-to-market ratio on the idiosyncratic
volatility is inconsistent with the Fama/ French (1993) result, namely
that value stocks are actually less volatile than the general market.
This result holds (albeit on slightly lower significance levels) even
if we control for negative book-to-market ratios either by excluding
companies with negative values or by employing a dummy variable
for negative/ positive values (results not presented). We also cannot
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explain why the reputation of Designated Sponsors plays a negative
role, so that a better (=lower) rank increases the volatility.
4 Underpricing
Several studies look at the differences in underpricing of venture- and
non venture-backed companies (see section 1). Our focus to a large ex-
tent is a different one. Instead of comparing venture- and non venture-
backed IPOs, we follow our previous route of analysis and investigate
potential underpricing differences between the different types of ven-
ture capital firms. Thus, we control for other factors such as market
conditions (approximated by the average extent of underpricing in the
five IPOs preceding the firm in question), firm age, growth potential
(using the book-to-market ratio as proxy) and market value. We also
include the issue size in order to take up the idea of Ljungqvist (1999).
He argues that underpricing is less costly if the total size of the issue
is small, thereby creating incentives to invest in costly marketing only
for large issues, in order to induce lower underpricing.
We investigate the following VC-related hypotheses:
• In contrast to bank-based and public VCs, who typically are only
bridge investors and are not very deeply involved in the hand-on
management of their portfolio companies (see Tykvova´ (2004)),
independent VCs typically are active, long-term investors. Thus,
they are able to better resolve informational asymmetries. Their
portfolio firms should display less underpricing.
• The more reputable and the older the VCs (see Gompers (1996)
and Neus/ Walz (2002)) are, the less pronounced the underpricing
that is expected to take place.
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• Public, bank-dependent and corporate VCs are seen as having
potential conflicts of interest, e.g. with their owners who may
pursue some particular goals (see Hellmann et al. (2003)) or with
the underwriters (see Hamao et al. (2000) and Gompers/ Lerner
(1999a)), forcing them to underprice more than other venture-
backed firms.
The results of our cross-section analysis are displayed in Table 8.
By and large we can not find any significant effects of the different
types of VCs on the extent of underpricing when controlling for mar-
ket value, book-to-market ratio, age of the firm, market conditions,
and the issue size. The coefficient of BANK is positive as expected,
indicating that firms backed by these types of VCs are underpriced to
a larger extent. The coefficients’ signs of PUBL, CORP and INDEP
are not clear-cut. However, none of these coefficients is significant.
Our Models IV-VI reveal a significant influence of the VC’s reputa-
tion on underpricing. The sign of RANK is, however, in contrast to
our theoretical considerations: the more reputable a VC, the higher
the degree of underpricing of its portfolio firm. This negative and sig-
nificant coefficient remains even if we include the VC-type variables
and the GERM variable, which has a positive impact, as expected, on
the extent of underpricing (see Models V and VI). We do not find any
support for the certification role of the underwriters.
The Ljungqvist-hypothesis that the size of the issue has a negative
impact on the degree of underpricing is strongly supported in our re-
gressions. We also find a strong positive impact of market conditions
on the degree of underpricing. If previous issues have been heavily
underpriced (indicating a hot issue period), it is likely to be true for
the issue under consideration. The book-to-market ratio has always
a negative impact. That is, firms with a higher expected growth po-
tential (i.e. with a lower book-to-market ratio) are more underpriced.
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Table 8: Cross-section regressions of underpricing
This table reports the results of different cross-section OLS regressions of underpricing.
The sample includes the entire sample of all venture-backed and all non venture-backed IPOs
for the 1997-2002 period on the Neuer Markt, Frankfurt. We excluded two firms, VIVA and
EM.TV.
t-statistics (corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White-sandwich estimator) are in
parentheses. Industry dummies are used as control variables, but not reported in the table.
The coefficient of the constant used in the estimations is also omitted.
One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. An asterisk
in brackets points to significance at the 15% level.
I: II: III: IV: V: VI:
Full Sample VC-Sample
and and other and and and other
VCs market reputation national market
participants origin participants
MV(∗10−6) 210.2 205.0 204.7 2231.9 2162.7 2171.7
(4.19)∗∗∗ (4.18)∗∗∗ (4.16)∗∗∗ (3.75)∗∗∗ (3.73)∗∗∗ (3.59)∗∗∗
BTM(∗10−6) −2.40 −2.53 −2.48 −2.27 −2.46 −2.76
(−2.57) ∗ ∗ (−2.56) ∗ ∗ (−2.57) ∗ ∗ (−1.44) (−1.59)(∗) (−1.57)(∗)
AGE(∗10−6) 8.76 10.00 8.68 20.80 22.30 26.70
(1.08) (1.15) (1.05) (2.20) ∗ ∗ (2.32) ∗ ∗ (2.49) ∗ ∗
SIZE(∗10−9) −2.92 −2.86 −2.85 −10.90 −10.20 −10.10
(−4.58)∗∗∗ (−4.59)∗∗∗ (−4.56)∗∗∗ (−3.79)∗∗∗ (−3.70)∗∗∗ (−3.42)∗∗∗
RECENT 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.47 0.47 0.46
(7.94)∗∗∗ (7.77)∗∗∗ (7.93)∗∗∗ (4.65)∗∗∗ (5.02)∗∗∗ (4.60)∗∗∗
BANK 0.09 0.08
(0.70) (0.70)
CORP −0.05 −0.04 −0.07
(−0.44) (−0.37) (−0.32)
INDEP 0.01 0.02 −0.10
(0.15) (0.21) (−0.62)




RANK −0.07 −0.10 −0.11
(−2.09) ∗ ∗ (−2.99)∗∗∗ (−2.92)∗∗∗
VC 0.05
(0.78)
LOCK −0.004 −0.003 −0.003





# of obs. 318 312 318 118 118 118
R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.47 0.48 0.49
Additionally to the results presented in this table, we calculated all models alternatively (a) removing companies
with negative book-to-market ratios and (b) employing a dummy variable for negative/ positive book-to-market
ratio. The results did not differ considerably.
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A higher VCs’ retention rate (LOCK) is obviously interpreted by the
market as a signal, so inducing a lower underpricing. Larger and older
firms are underpriced more, which is not in line with our intuition.
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
The main objective of the present paper was to investigate the impact
of VCs’ corporate governance, experience and objectives on the per-
formance of their portfolio firms around and after IPO. In doing so,
we wanted to shed some additional light on the function of venture
capital in nurturing and developing their portfolio firms as well as on
some mechanisms of the IPO market. Our main working hypothe-
sis was that venture capital was too heterogenous to permit simple
comparison between non venture and venture-backed firms.
In order to pursue our objective, we compared the performance of
firms backed by different VCs and non-venture backed firms in the
course of IPO, looking at the extent of underpricing and at post-IPO
returns and volatility. Germany’s Neuer Markt has proven to be a
natural playing field for such a research strategy, deferring a number of
obvious advantages (but also one disadvantage). The main advantage
was that, due to the specific situation of the German venture capital
market (a young, rapidly growing market coupled with a strong public
sector), we found a wide array of different types of venture capitalists
with quite different structures, objectives, and track records. Our
main aim was to exploit just this difference and its impact on the
performance of portfolio firms. The disadvantage was closely related
to the advantages: due to the relative youth of the Neuer Markt we
had at our disposal only a rather short time series, a fact that obliged
us to restrict our analysis to this short timespan and, hence, to two-
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year performance measures. Despite this limitation, we are very much
convinced that the advantages clearly outweigh this disadvantage.
With respect to post-IPO performance, we found strong support
for the hypothesis that VCs, and particularly independent and for-
eign VCs as well as VCs with a high reputation, added more value to
their portfolio companies. This fact was underestimated by the mar-
ket participants. Thus, investors who bought shares of firms backed
by independent VCs did significantly better in a two-year period after
IPO compared to investors who relied on other similar firms in Ger-
many’s Neuer Markt. Surprisingly, these investors were able to sleep
better since prices of their shares fluctuated less. Investors who ac-
quired shares of firms in which the lead VC was a public one bought
into low returns. This leads us to conclude that different corporate
governance structures, different experience levels, and different objec-
tives among the different types of VCs actually did have an observable
and significant impact on the portfolio firms’ post-IPO performance.
When looking into the determinants of underpricing we found rather
little evidence that the extent of underpricing differed significantly be-
tween firms backed by different VCs. Furthermore, we concluded – and
this comes somewhat as a surprise – that the reputation of the VC
had a positive impact on underpricing. The fact that we were not
able (due to the lack of data on issue costs, see Ljungqvist (1999))
to fully eliminate potential endogeneity problems in our underpricing
estimations, however, leads us to a rather cautious interpretation of
our underpricing results.
Our findings on the post-IPO performance as well as the ones in
Tykvova´ (2004) imply that the different types of VCs fulfilled their
overall task as specialized monitors, consultants, and financiers of
young firms in quite different ways. These differences were not cor-
rectly assessed by the market. Therefore, it would be very interesting
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to see whether these differences also exist in the pre-IPO period. We
leave the task of investigating this with pre-IPO cashflow data to our
future research.
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